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A U.N. SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM FROM HELL 
A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE. 
By Samantha Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002, Pp. 610. 
Reviewed by Sherrie L. Russell-Brown* 
Why has the United States been a bystander to genocide? That is the 
fundamental question that Samantha Power explores in her Pulitzer Prize 
winning book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.1 
According to Power, the answers lie in the critical decisions, including 
decisions not to decide, made before, during, and after the various 
genocides she surveys.2 This Review of Power’s book expands on that 
question. Why has the international community been a bystander to 
genocide?3  
An example of the international community’s failure to respond in the 
face of genocide is Rwanda, almost ten years ago. On April 6, 1994, Major 
General Romeo Dallaire—Commander of the United Nations Assistance 
 * Assistant Professor of Law and an Associate Director of the Center on Children and the 
Law, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin College of Law; B.A. (Government), 1989, Pomona 
College; J.D., 1992, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M. (International Law/International 
Human Rights Law), 1999, Columbia University School of Law. I would like to thank Profs. 
Wayne O. Hanewicz, Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Lyrissa Lidsky, Bill Page, Christopher Slobogin, 
Gaylin Soponis, Danaya Wright, and Barbara Woodhouse for their comments and suggestions.  
 1. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
XVII (2002).  
 2. Id. 
 3. Recent events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might prove that the 
international community will no longer be a bystander to genocide. On May 30, 2003, after reports 
that the “whole area is in a precarious situation,” the U.N. Security Council “gave the green light 
for a heavily armed international force” which France would lead for three months in Bunia—the 
capital city of the Ituri province in the DRC. See AFX European Focus, UN Authorises 
International Peacekeeping Force for DR Congo, MONUC, May 30, 2003, available at 
http://www.monuc.org/news.asp?table= news&language=0&id=689; see also Samson Mulugeta, 
UN Congo HQ Under Siege, NEWSDAY, May 8, 2003, available at http://www.newsday.com/ 
news/nationworld/world/ny-congo0507,0,5527054.story?coll=ny-top-headlines. France would 
provide half of the 1,400 soldiers to be deployed in Bunia. See AFX European Focus, UN 
Authorises International Peacekeeping Force for DR Congo, MONUL, Apr. 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.monuc.org/news.asp?table=news&language=0&id=689. On June 4, 2003, Kofi Annan 
said that a 3,800-strong U.N. peacekeeping force should replace the 1,400 French-led international 
force, which is expected to start arriving in Bunia later in the week. See Associated Press, U.N. 
Chief Calls for More Troops in Congo, MONUC, June 4, 2003, available at 
http://www.monuc.org/news.asp?table=news&language=0&id=698. Belgium, Sweden, Britain, 
Brazil, and South Africa have said that they will contribute to the international force, and Ethiopia 
is also likely to send troops. Id. But, as this Review develops, this type of response is unusual and 
its efficacy remains to be seen. In addition, it does not approach the formalized, structured response 
that this essay suggests should be pursued. 
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Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a multinational force of approximately 
2,548 “troops”4—predicted that the seeming peace between the Hutu and 
Tutsis could easily be shattered.5 On that same day, the Hutu President of 
Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, was killed and before dawn on April 7, 
1994, the genocide against the Tutsi (and those considered to be 
sympathetic to them) had begun.6 It continued up until July 18, 1994.7  
Symbolic of America’s confusion about the nature of the events, 
Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, then Director of Strategic Plans and 
Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, recalled staff officers 
asking, upon learning of the crash of Habyarimana’s plane, “Is it Hutu and 
Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?”8 On April 7, 1994, just after dawn, Hutu soldiers 
rounded up fifteen of Dallaire’s peacekeeping forces. Five Ghanaian 
peacekeepers were led to safety, while ten Belgian peacekeepers were 
killed and savagely mutilated.9 On April 21, 1994, after some countries 
had already unilaterally withdrawn their own troops, the Security Council 
reduced Dallaire’s UNAMIR force from 2,548 to 270.10 Dallaire included 
the term “genocide” for the first time in his situation report during the last 
week in April 1994.11 Dallaire warned, “Unless the international 
community acts, it may find it is unable to defend itself against accusations 
of doing nothing to stop genocide.”12 Warren Christopher, then U.S. 
Secretary of State, did not give his diplomats permission to use the term 
“genocide” until May 21, 1994. By then, most of the Tutsi victims of the 
 4. On October 5, 1993, the U.N. Security Council established UNAMIR. See UNAMIR, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirFT.htm [hereinafter UNAMIR 
I]. Its mandate was, inter alia, to help implement and monitor the implementation of the Arusha 
Peace Agreement—a comprehensive peace agreement concluded on August 4, 1993 to end the 
fighting between the Hutu government soldiers and a Tutsi armed force called the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front (RPF). Id.; see also UNAMIR, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ 
dpko/co_mission/unamirS.htm [hereinafter UNAMIR II]. The Agreement “called for a 
democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional 
Government until the elections, in addition to repatriation of [Tutsi] refugees and integration of the 
armed forces of the two sides.” Supra UNAMIR I. 
 5. See POWER, supra note 1, at XVII. 
 6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING 
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1996) [hereinafter Shattered Lives]; Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ch. 2, ¶¶ 107, 111 (Judgment, Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Sept. 
2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/English/cases/Akayesu/judgment/akay001.htm 
[hereinafter Akayesu Judgment]. 
 7. See Akayesu Judgment, 2, ¶¶ 107, 111.  
 8. See POWER, supra note 1, at 330. 
 9. See id. at 331-32. 
 10. See UNAMIR II, supra note 4.  
 11. See POWER, supra note 1, at 358. 
 12. Id. 
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genocide were already dead.13 On June 10, 1994, when questioned by 
Reuters correspondent Alan Elsner, State Department spokesperson 
Christine Shelly provided the following responses:14 
Elsner: How would you describe the events taking place in 
Rwanda? 
Shelly: Based on the evidence we have seen from observations on 
the ground, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide 
have occurred in Rwanda. 
Elsner: What’s the difference between “acts of genocide” and 
“genocide?” 
Shelly: Well, I think the—as you know, there’s a legal definition of 
this . . . . Clearly not all of the killings, that have taken place in 
Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label . . . . But as 
to the distinctions between the words, we’re trying to call what we 
have seen so far as best as we can; and based, again, on the 
evidence, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide 
have occurred. 
Elsner: How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide? 
Shelly: Alan, that’s just not a question that I’m in a position to 
answer. 
Estimates of the number of victims slaughtered during the roughly 100 
days of Rwanda’s genocide vary from 500,000 to 1,000,000 or more—
meaning that there were between 5,000 and 10,000 victims a day!15 
Was the international community a bystander to the Rwandan genocide 
because of a lack of certainty that a “genocide” was taking place or 
because of a lack of political resolve? Was it a combination of both? Did 
political indecision about what to do in the face of the genocide drive 
decisions on whether and when the situation was defined to be 
“genocide?” I think it is the latter. When I began to puzzle through this 
problem, I wondered whether a possible antidote to denial and inaction 
would be the creation of a body—a “Genocide Committee”—under the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,16 which might aid in removing the genocide question from the 
 13. Id. at 361-62, 379. 
 14. Id. at 363-64. 
 15. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 6, ch.2, ¶ 111.  
 
 16. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Genocide Convention provides: 
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political arena. Such a Committee could specifically be charged with 
identifying a potential genocide; formulating measures to prevent, 
intervene in, and stop genocide; and issuing the call to action once a 
genocide had commenced. Similar committees exist under other 
international human rights treaties.17  
After researching the idea, I quickly discovered that eighteen years ago, 
the United Nations had conducted a study of the prevention and 
punishment of genocide, which proposed preventive and early warning 
mechanisms.18 The Study also proposed the creation of a Committee on 
Genocide.19 I examined the Study and determined that the United Nations 
had already provided the international community with a formula that 
addresses the flaw identified by Power: inaction in the face of sufficient 
“genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.” 
Id. art. 2. According to Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, “The following acts shall be 
punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.” Article 4 of the 
Genocide Convention explains that “[p]ersons committing genocide or any of the acts enumerated 
in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials 
or private individuals.”  
 17. See United Nations Documentation: Research Guide (2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/spechr.htm (listing treaty committees). 
 18. Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, Thirty-Eighth session, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) [hereinafter, the U.N. 
Study] at 41-43. As part of the U.N. Study, Governments, specialized agencies and other U.N. 
organizations, regional organizations as well as non-governmental organizations were given a 
questionnaire asking them for suggestions  
for more effective national measures for the prevention, control and punishment of genocide; 
[s]uggestions for more effective international measures to prevent perpetration of genocide 
including the possibility of further international action, in particular by the adoption of new 
international instruments; [c]omments and suggestions on the possibility of establishing an 
international body entrusted with carrying out investigations, considering allegations of 
genocide and taking steps necessary to halt at its outset the deliberate destruction of national, 
racial, religious or ethnic groups; [c]omments and suggestions on the possibility of preparing 
an additional protocol to the Convention of 9 December 1948 on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [Genocide Convention], conferring upon the courts of 
countries other than those in whose territory the crime of genocide was committed, 
competence to deal with that crime; [c]omments and suggestions on the possibility of 
establishing an international criminal jurisdiction as proposed in article VI of the Genocide 
Convention. 
Id. at 2-3, ¶ 9. 
 19. Id. at 43-45. 
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information that a genocide is taking place. 
In A Problem from Hell, Power analyzes each genocide that she 
surveys in terms of four sub-topics: (1) Warning, (2) Recognition, (3) 
Response, and, (4) Aftermath.20 Within these sub-topics, Power analyzes, 
inter alia, the following questions:21 What, if any, were the early warnings 
that mass killing was set to commence? How seriously were the warnings 
taken? By whom? What, if any, were the constraints that operated to 
impede diagnosis and how and when did U.S. officials recognize that 
genocide (and not merely war) was under way? Who inside or outside the 
U.S. government wanted to do what and who prevailed? And, finally, how 
were the U.S. responses, the genocides, and the Americans who urged 
intervention remembered later?  
Power asks these questions because she is trying to understand where, 
in the evolution of a genocide, the breakdown occurred and therefore, 
what can be done. The U.N. Study engaged in a very similar endeavor but 
on the international plane. With respect to the Genocide Convention, the 
Study recognized that there was a problem with preventive and early 
warning measures as well as with getting States to act. The Study made 
proposals to address those problems. Perhaps because Power focuses on 
U.S. policy towards genocide, she does not fully explore the Study and 
how it could be instrumental in addressing the issues she raises.22 Indeed, 
the Study and its proposals, have not been fully explored in current 
international law literature. I hope to bring attention to a very important, 
yet largely ignored piece of work that provides mechanisms that address 
the issues Power raises. Until the international community has serious 
mechanisms to respond to genocide, the United States is not going to leap 
into the breach. Power’s questions about the United States can be resolved 
only if there is a resolution of the same questions on the international level. 
Otherwise, her questions are mere hand-wringing. 
In Part I of this Review, I discuss the genesis, thesis, and major 
findings of A Problem from Hell. In Part II, I discuss the U.N. Study, its 
findings and proposals, along with a subsequent U.N. report. I conclude 
that, armed with Power’s book, which supports the findings and proposals 
of the U.N. Study, it is time for the international community to implement 
the Study’s proposals. 
 20. See POWER, supra note 1, at XVII. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 154 (citing the Study in a footnote in reference to its statement that the Khmer 
Rouge committed genocide in Cambodia). 
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I. 
A Problem from Hell was born of Power’s experiences covering the 
genocide in Bosnia and watching the world’s response to it. From 1993 
until 1996, Power23 covered the wars in the former Yugoslavia as a 
reporter for U.S. News and World Report and the Economist. Possibly as a 
result of her experience as a journalist, A Problem from Hell is a 
thoroughly researched, comprehensive, and accessible examination of U.S. 
foreign policy towards genocide in the twentieth century. 
In her Preface, Power explains the genesis, thesis, and major findings 
of her book. Power recounts the story of Sidbela Zimic—a nine-year-old 
Sarajevan who was killed on June 25, 1995, when a Serb shell crashed into 
the playground where she and three of her friends were jumping rope.24 
According to Power, a year and a half before, in February 1994, a shell 
had landed in the main downtown market of Sarajevo, two blocks from 
Sidbela’s home.25 President Clinton and his NATO allies threatened 
massive air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they resumed their 
bombardment of Sarajevo and, in response, Sarajevans began to trickle 
outside.26 However, as Power explains, U.S. resolve soon wilted and Serb 
nationalists “took their cue,” understanding “that they were free to resume 
shelling Sarajevo and other Bosnian towns crammed with civilians.”27 
America’s promises brought Sarajevans a brief reprieve, but also raised 
expectations that they were safe to live again.28 It was in that context that 
Sidbela was able to convince her normally cautious parents to let her play 
outside . . . for the last time.29 Power also recounts the fall on July 6, 1995 
of Srebenica—a U.N. safe area—where an estimated 7,000 Muslim men 
were rounded up and executed by the Bosnian Serbs.30  
In part, as a result of her experiences, Power was motivated to explore 
“America’s responses to previous cases of mass slaughter.”31 As Power 
explains,  
 23. Lecturer in Public Policy and former Founding Executive Director of the Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
 24. See POWER, supra note 1, at XIII. 
 25. Id. at XI. 
 26. Id. at XI, XII. 
 27. Id. at XII. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at XII, XIII. 
 30. Id. at XIII, XIV. 
 31. Id. at XV. 
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American response to the Bosnian genocide was in fact the most 
robust of the century. The United States had never in its history 
intervened to stop genocide and had in fact rarely even made a point 
of condemning it as it occurred.32  
According to Power, the Bosnian Serbs’ eradication of the non-Serbs, 
the Ottoman slaughter of the Armenians, the Nazi Holocaust, Pol Pot’s 
terror in Cambodia, Saddam Hussein’s destruction of Kurds in northern 
Iraq, and the Rwandan Hutus’ systematic extermination of the Tutsi, each 
met the definition of genocide set forth in the Genocide Convention.33 But 
each met with a very similar U.S. policy response—effectively, no 
response.34  
Specifically, Power summarizes the major findings of her book as 
follows:35 
 Despite graphic media coverage, American policymakers, 
journalists, and citizens are extremely slow to muster the 
imagination needed to reckon with evil. Ahead of the killings, 
they assume rational actors will not inflict seemingly gratuitous 
violence. They trust in good-faith negotiations and traditional 
diplomacy. Once the killings start, they assume that civilians 
who keep their heads down will be left alone. They urge 
ceasefires and donate humanitarian aid.
 It is in the realm of domestic politics that the battle to stop 
genocide is lost. American political leaders interpret society-
wide silence as an indicator of public indifference. They reason 
that they will incur no costs if the United States remains 
uninvolved but will face steep risks if they engage. Potential 
sources of influence – lawmakers on Capitol Hill, editorial 
boards, non-governmental groups, and ordinary constituents – 
do not generate political pressure sufficient to change the 
calculus of America’s leaders.
 The U.S. government not only abstains from sending troops, but 
it takes very few steps along a continuum of intervention to 
deter genocide.
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at XVI. 
 35. Id. at XVII, XVIII. 
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 U.S. officials spin themselves (as well as the American public) 
about the nature of the violence in question and the likely impact 
of an American intervention. They render the bloodshed two-
sided and inevitable, not genocidal. They insist that any 
proposed U.S. response will be futile. Indeed, it may even do 
more harm than good, bringing perverse consequences to the 
victims and jeopardizing other precious American moral or 
strategic interests. They brand as “emotional” those U.S. 
officials who urge intervention and who make moral arguments 
in a system that speaks principally in the cold language of 
interests. They avoid use of the word “genocide.” Thus, they can 
in good conscience favor stopping genocide in the abstract, 
while simultaneously opposing American involvement in the 
moment.
Power also explains in her Preface that A Problem from Hell 
deliberately spotlights the response of American policymakers and 
citizens for several reasons:36  
[T]he U.S. decisions to act or not to act have had a greater impact 
on the victims’ fortunes than those of any other major power;37  
 [S]ince World War II, the United States has had a tremendous 
capacity to curb genocide [and] . . . could have used its vast 
resources to do so without undermining U.S. security;38 
 [T]he United States has made an unusually pronounced 
commitment to Holocaust commemoration and education;39  
 [I]n recent years, American leaders steeped in a new culture of 
Holocaust awareness, have repeatedly committed themselves [in 
theory] to preventing the recurrence of genocide . . . [which] 
commitment proved hollow in the face of actual slaughter.40  
Power ends her Preface by noting that before she began exploring 
America’s relationship with genocide, she used to refer to U.S. policy 
 36. Id. at XX. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at XX, XXI. 
 39. Id. at XXI. 
 40. Id. 
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toward Bosnia as a “failure,” but that she has since changed her mind.41 
According to Power, the United States’ 
consistent policy of nonintervention in the face of genocide offers 
sad testimony not to a broken American political system but to one 
that is ruthlessly effective. The system, as it stands now, is working. 
No U.S. president has ever made genocide prevention a priority, 
and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically for his 
indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that 
genocide rages on.42  
Between the Preface and the Conclusion, Power has a few chapters on 
Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Jewish man who coined the word “genocide” 
and fought tirelessly to have it recognized by the United Nations as a 
crime. Recognition finally came with the adoption of the United Nations’ 
first treaty, the Genocide Convention, on December 9, 1948. Additionally, 
there are chapters on Turkey and the Armenians, Cambodia, Iraq, Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo. Finally, there is a chapter that addresses 
the call for the establishment of international criminal tribunals in response 
to some of these genocides, the eventual establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, as well as the recent 
creation of the International Criminal Court.  
In her Conclusion, in addition to reiterating the findings she laid out in 
the Preface, Power suggests that a “mechanism for altering the calculus of 
U.S. leaders would be to make them publicly or professionally 
accountable for inaction.”43 In terms of what the United States might do in 
any future case of genocide, Power believes that post-September 11th, the 
U.S. government is likely to argue that it cannot afford to put its resources 
into genocide suppression or prevention.44 According to Power, that 
“would be a tragic and ultimately self-defeating mistake” for two 
reasons.45 The first reason is moral: “[w]hen innocent life is being taken on 
such a scale and the United States has the power to stop the killing at 
reasonable risk, it has a duty to act.”46 The second is enlightened self-
interest: allowing genocide undermines regional and international stability, 
creates militarized refugees, and signals dictators that hate and murder are 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 510. 
 44. Id. at 511-12. 
 45. Id. at 512. 
 46. Id. 
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permissible tools of statecraft. Power recognizes that because these threats 
to U.S. interests are long-term dangers and not immediately apparent, they 
rarely sway top U.S. policymakers.47 But she ends her 600-page book with 
the following poignant plea:  
George Bernard Shaw once wrote, “The reasonable man adapts 
himself to the world. The unreasonable one persists in trying to 
adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the 
unreasonable man.” After a century of doing so little to prevent, 
suppress, and punish genocide, Americans must join and thereby 
legitimate the ranks of the unreasonable.48 
A Problem from Hell is an extremely accessible, well-researched and 
well-documented book. In terms of its usefulness to the international legal 
community, the emphasis of this Review, it sounds a number of important 
themes. First, from an international humanitarian law perspective, the 
genocides Power discusses were “masked” by armed conflict, both in the 
sense that there was an inability to distinguish deaths and casualty that are 
common to war from a “genocide,” and also in the sense that armed 
conflict often served as a “mask” or an excuse to commit a genocide that 
had already been brewing. Second, from a U.S. foreign policy perspective, 
those committing the genocides assumed that the United States would not 
act if it did not serve U.S. interests and knew that casualties among 
foreigners—usually Westerners—would result in the international 
community’s withdrawal of its forces, allowing the genocide to proceed 
unimpeded. Finally, and most importantly, a theme throughout the book is 
the unwillingness and reluctance of the United States to define mass 
murders and massacres as “genocide” for fear that by doing so, obligations 
under international law might be triggered. Power’s book suggests that the 
problem may not be with lack of certitude or knowledge about the nature 
of the violence. The problem may lie with the critical decisions about what 
to do in the face of genocide.  
The international legal community, therefore, needs to work on 
specifying the parameters of the obligations imposed on a State in the face 
of a genocide. If States understood specifically what they might be 
required to do in order to suppress or prevent genocide, this understanding 
would likely reduce the reluctance of States, like the United States, to 
acknowledge the commission of what later are deemed clear cases of 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 516. 
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genocide. Power makes some suggestions as to what the United States 
should do in the face of a genocide.49 According to Power, the United 
States  
must respond to genocide with a sense of urgency, publicly 
identifying and threatening the perpetrators with prosecution, 
demanding the expulsion of representatives of genocidal regimes 
from international institutions such as the United Nations, closing 
the perpetrators’ embassies in the United States, and calling upon 
countries aligned with the perpetrators to ask them to use their 
influence. When the dynamics on the ground warrant it, the United 
States should establish economic sanctions, freeze foreign assets, 
and use U.S. technical resources to deprive the killers of their 
means of propagating hate. With its allies, it should set up safe areas 
to house refugees and civilians, and protect them with well-armed 
and robustly mandated peacekeepers, airpower, or both. Given the 
affront genocide represents to America’s most cherished values and 
to its interests, the United States must also be prepared to risk the 
lives of its soldiers in the service of stopping this monstrous 
crime.50  
Even more can be done. As explained above, the United Nations has 
already provided the international legal community with a model. The 
U.N. 1985 Study assumed that a genocide can be defined or identified, and 
focused on measures to prevent a genocide from occurring and on the 
actions that can be taken at the outset of or during a genocide in order to 
stop it. In 1994, months after the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations 
dusted off the 1985 Study and “requested” that States Parties to the 
Genocide Convention implement the Study’s proposals for forming a 
Genocide Committee. The request went (and continues to go) unheeded. 
Although focused on America’s responses to genocide, the facts that 
Power marshals and analyzes demand that the international community act 
and that the focus of international action should be on clarifying what, if 
any, are the obligations of States before, during and after a genocide. The 
U.N. Study is a start.  
 49. Id. at 514. 
 50. Id.  
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II.  
In 1983, the United Nations Economic and Social Council requested 
that the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities appoint a Special Rapporteur with the mandate to revise and 
update a study prepared in 1978 on the question of the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide.51 The Subcommission appointed Mr. 
Benjamin Whitaker to undertake the revised and updated study.52 The 
Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was presented at the 38th session of 
the Subcomission in 1985.53 
By 1985, as the Study noted,  
[t]he Nazi aberration [was] unfortunately not . . . the only case of 
genocide in the twentieth century. Among other examples [of 
genocide] are the German massacre of Hereros in 1904, the 
Ottoman massacre of Armenians in 1915-1916, the Ukrainian 
pogrom of Jews in 1919, the Tutsi massacre of Hutu in Burundi in 
1965 and 1972, the Paraguayan massacre of Aché Indians prior to 
1974, the Khmer Rouge massacre in Kampuchea between 1975 and 
1978, and the contemporary Iranian killings of Baha’is.54 
The purpose and hope of the Study was “to deter future violence by 
strengthening collective international responsibility and remedies.”55 
According to the Study,  
it is difficult to conceive of a heavier responsibility for the 
international community and the Human Rights bodies of the 
United Nations than to undertake any effective steps possible to 
prevent and punish genocide in order to deter its recurrence. It has 
rightly been said that those people who do not learn from history, 
are condemned to repeat it. This belief underpins much of the 
Human Rights work of the United Nations. In order to prescribe the 
optimal remedies to prevent future genocide, it can be of positive 
assistance to diagnose past cases in order to analyse their 
 51. U.N. Study, supra note 31, at 1, ¶¶ 1-6.   
 52. Id. ¶ 1. 
 53. U.N. Study, supra note 31. 
 54. Id. at 8-10, ¶ 24. 
 55. Id. at 5, ¶ 16. 
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causation together with such lessons as the international 
community may learn from the history of these events.56 
The Study then went on to analyze and discuss the concept of 
genocide; the Genocide Convention itself; the necessary extent of the 
destruction of a group; the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, 
including a discussion of whether sexual groups “such as women, men, or 
homosexuals,” or political groups should be protected by the Convention; 
the definition of genocide to include cultural genocide or ethnocide and 
also ecocide, i.e., “the adverse alterations, chemical weapons, serious 
pollution and acid rain, or destruction of the rain forest, which threaten the 
existence of entire populations, whether deliberately or with criminal 
negligence;” the intent necessary under the Genocide Convention; the acts 
punishable; apartheid in relation to the Genocide Convention; propaganda 
in favor of genocide; culpability and superior orders; enforcement; the 
question of time limitation; and extradition.57 At the end, the Study made 
proposals.58 
Aside from the proposal for an international human rights tribunal or 
court, which the international community has already created (the 
International Criminal Court),59 the Study’s proposals related to 
prevention, early warning, and the creation of an international body to deal 
with genocide.  
First, with respect to preventive measures, the Study acknowledged 
that punishment after a genocide did not prevent genocide.60 The Study 
stated that, “[t]hose personalities who are psychologically prepared to 
commit genocide are not always likely to be deterred by retribution, at 
least in this world.”61 Yet, the Study conceded that the “most conspicuous 
weakness of the Genocide Convention is that it insufficiently formulates 
preventive measures.”62 The Study proposed the creation of a continuously 
updated data bank that could anticipate potential cases and compare the 
lessons, both positive and negative, of previous cases.63 The Study 
suggested that experienced conciliators or mediators could be deployed to 
 56. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 14-15. 
 57. Id. at 5-35. 
 58. Id. at 41-45. 
 59. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9 (1998) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ 
statute/romefra.htm. 
 60. See U.N. Study, supra note 31, at 41, ¶ 78. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. ¶ 79. 
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defuse any tension.64 The Study also suggested, in order to analyze the 
causes of genocide, investing time and research into the “psychological 
character and motivation of individuals and groups who commit genocide 
or racism, or the psychopathic dehumanizing of vulnerable minorities or 
scapegoats.”65 According to the Study, the research could become part of 
educational programs, “starting at an early age in schools,” to mobilize 
public awareness and vigilance to guard against a recurrence of 
genocide.66 As a further safeguard, the Study suggested that, “public 
awareness should be developed internationally to reinforce the individual’s 
responsibility, based on knowledge that it is illegal to obey a superior 
order or law that violates human rights.”67 
Second, on the issue of an effective early warning system, the Study 
acknowledged that any such system “requires an efficient co-ordinating 
network, maintained in a state of permanent readiness.” Such a network 
could watch for early indications of mass famine and exoduses of 
refugees.68 Once an early warning alert is received, the Study suggested 
that the steps that could be taken include: investigating the allegations, 
activating different bodies of the United Nations, calling on States to get 
involved, seeking support of the international press to provide information 
on and to call public attention to the threat or actuality of genocidal 
massacre, asking various leaders to intercede, and arranging for the 
immediate involvement of suitable mediators and conciliators at the 
outset.69 The Study also suggested sanctions by means of economic 
boycotts, the refusal to handle goods to or from the offending States, and 
selective exclusion from participation in international activities and 
events.70 
Finally, on the issue of an international body to deal with genocide, the 
Study described a possible formulation proposed by a non-governmental 
organization, the Baha’i International (Baha’i).71 According to Baha’i, 
the most effective means of preventing and controlling genocide is 
through the establishment by the United Nations of a new 
international body dealing exclusively with genocide and charged 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 41-42, ¶ 80. 
 66. Id. ¶ 81. 
 67. Id. ¶ 82. 
 68. Id. ¶ 83. 
 69. Id. at 42-43, ¶ 84. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 43, ¶ 85. 
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with responsibility for considering allegations of genocide, carrying 
out investigations in connection with those allegations of genocide 
and taking urgent steps to put a stop to genocide wherever it is 
known to be taking place.72  
Baha’i considered that  
[s]ince secrecy is the greatest ally of any Government that seeks to 
engage in genocide, and international publicity and condemnation 
the greatest enemy, it might be expected that the opprobrium that 
would attach to any Government which was identified as a violator 
of the Convention by a high-level international body of known 
competence and impartiality would, on its own, act as a deterrent to 
that Government, quite apart from any action that the international 
body itself was able to generate.73 
Therefore, Baha’i suggested that the Genocide Convention be revised 
to add appropriate provisions for the creation of a “Committee on 
Genocide.”74  
According to Baha’i, such a Committee “would concern itself 
primarily with questions of fact rather than with questions of law.”75 
Baha’i envisioned that the Committee would hold a “watching brief” on 
genocide: “it would be the body to which any allegations of genocide were 
automatically referred and it would be responsible for investigating those 
allegations.”76 Under the proposed formulation of Baha’i:  
[i]n order to enable [the Committee] to react effectively in cases 
where there were strong and reliable indications that genocide was, 
in fact, taking place, the Committee should . . . be empowered to (a) 
invite the State party concerned to submit its observations with 
regard to the allegations of genocide; and (b) if it decided that the 
situation warranted it, designate one or more of its members to 
make a confidential inquiry and to report to the Committee 
urgently. In short, we envisage the Committee being given powers 
in this regard similar to those proposed for the Torture Committee 
in the Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.77 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 44, ¶ 85. 
 76. Id. 
 
 77. Id. 
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Baha’i envisioned that the Genocide Committee, like the other human 
rights treaty committees, would be empowered to bring any situations of 
urgency to the immediate attention of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.78 Finally, Baha’i listed as the advantages of establishing a 
Genocide Committee:  
(a) [the removal of] the subject of genocide as far as possible from 
the political arena; (b) [the attraction of] a high-calibre 
“independent expert” membership; (c) [the speeding up of] the 
international response to genocidal situations by obviating the 
necessity for cases of genocide to proceed through the hierarchical 
mechanisms of the United Nations human rights system; (d) [the 
provision of] high-profile, international focus for genocide that is 
currently lacking.79  
Again, the U.N. Study assumed that genocide could be identified and 
on prevented through early warning and affirmative actions taken to stop 
genocide. A subsequent U.N. report on Rwanda bears out that the obstacle 
to international action, be it prevention, early warning or steps to stop a 
genocide that is occurring, is not lack of certitude but a lack of clarity on 
what the international community is obligated to do in the face of 
genocide.  
The report, dated eight months before the Rwandan genocide, was 
written by a Special Rapporteur who visited Rwanda one year before the 
genocide. It contained all of the information necessary to indicate that a 
genocide against the Tutsi was being organized.80  
According to the Report: 
 People in Rwanda expressed a fear of refugee Tutsis returning to 
Rwanda and “reasserting” Tutsi domination;  
 Some Hutus had been accused by Hutu extremists of being 
traitors to Rwanda in part because of willingness to enter into 
peace-talks and a dialogue with the FPR—a Tutsi armed force; 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the 
World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and Territories, 
Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum, Report by Mr. B.W. Ndiaye, Special 
Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1 (Aug. 11, 
1993) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. 
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 There were certain Hutu elite, who in order to hold onto power, 
fueled ethnic hatred against the Tutsi; 
 Weapons were being distributed to civilians;  
 There had been massacres of mainly Tutsi civilians and 
government officials were involved, either directly by 
encouraging, planning, directing or participating in the violence, 
or indirectly through incompetence, negligence or deliberate 
inaction;  
 There was an endemic practice by government armed forces of 
raping Tutsi women, including twelve-year-olds who were raped 
because their young age was regarded as a protection against 
AIDS;  
 Certain mayors had spread unfounded rumors exacerbating 
ethnic hatred and had encouraged the population to massacre 
Tutsi people;  
 The Hutu political party, the National Revolutionary Movement 
for Democracy and Development (MRND), in order to avoid 
responsibility, had started to “privatize” the violence by 
channeling it through the youth wing of the MRND, which had 
been converted into a militia;  
 These armed bands, trained by members of the Hutu 
government’s armed forces, were able to set up roadblocks and 
impose a reign of terror with complete impunity;  
 The worst violence could be attributed to “out-of-control” mobs 
of Hutu peasants;  
 Most of the massacres were the result of ethnic violence, said to 
be deliberately fomented by certain individuals allegedly close 
to those in power;  
 A study of the phases preceding the outbreaks of violence 
among the population showed that such outbreaks of violence 
were planned and prepared, with targets being identified in 
speeches by representatives of the authorities, as well as in 
broadcasts on Rwandese radio and in leaflets;  
 Local government officials were organizing and leading the 
massacres, evidenced by the co-extensiveness of the violence 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p427 Russell-Brown book pages.doc  10/29/03   10:02 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
444 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2:427 
 
 
 
 
 
with local boundaries, the simultaneousness of the violence, and 
the similarity of the rumors that preceded the violence; 
 The violence, usually directed against the Tutsi, went 
unpunished and if any persons were arrested, they were released 
without being made to stand trial.81  
As factors facilitating the violation of largely the Tutsis right to life, the 
Report identified, the absence of the rule of law, the tradition of impunity, 
the absence of any system for the protection of ethnic minorities, and 
injurious propaganda.82 The Report indicated that there were no real police 
in the over-populated rural areas, nor any effective warning system within 
reach of ethnic minorities themselves or their representatives, and that 
everything was left to the diligence of local government officials, who 
were often accomplices in the massacres or had even instigated them.83 
With respect to an incident of violence, the Report noted the fact that the 
region’s telephone system had “suddenly” broken down at the time of the 
events and had “curiously” become operational again without any need for 
repairs.84 With respect to “injurious propaganda,” the Report stated that 
the  
involvement of the media in spreading unfounded rumours and in 
exacerbating ethnic problems had been noted on repeated 
occasions. Radio Rwanda, which is the only source of information 
for the majority of a poorly educated population and which is still 
under the direct control of the President, has played a pernicious 
role in instigating several massacres. This is particularly true of 
certain broadcasts in Kinyarwanda which differ markedly in content 
from news programmes broadcast in French, which is understood 
only by a small part of the population.85 
The Report recommended, inter alia, a mechanism for the protection of 
civilian populations against massacres, a National Reconciliation 
Campaign, the reform of the role and structure of the media, combating 
impunity, and the issuance of new identity cards which would not contain 
an ethnic reference.86 On the question of whether the massacres of the 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 28, 33, 37, 40, 42. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 44, 45, 55-58. 
 83. Id. ¶ 55. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. ¶ 56. 
 86. Id. ¶¶ 64-66, 68, 69-70, 75-76, 84. 
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largely Tutsi civilian population may be termed “genocide,” the Report 
stated that  
[t]he cases of intercommunal violence brought to [the Special 
Rapporteur’s] attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the 
attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been 
targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic 
group, and for no other objective reason.87 
The Report stated that, therefore, Article II (a) and (b) and Article III of 
the Genocide Convention might be considered to apply to the violations of 
the right to life described in the report.88 
We know what happened one year after the Special Rapporteur’s visit 
to Rwanda. The Hutu President of Rwanda was murdered on his way back 
from attending a peace conference in Tanzania, most likely by extremist 
Hutu’s, as a pretext to start the genocide.89 Roadblocks were set up that 
allowed the genocide to be perpetrated, in main part, by the 
Interahamwe—the youth movement of the MRND.90 Identity cards were 
often used to identify a victim’s ethnicity before being killed.91 Local 
government officials, including mayors of communes, directly and 
indirectly participated in the genocide.92 The use of rape as an act of 
genocide against Tutsi women (or Hutu women married to Tutsi) was 
widespread.93 Radio and speeches played a large role in inciting the 
genocide and in identifying potential victims.94 
In sum, it seems the United Nations had for a full year before the 
genocide actually occurred, an overwhelming amount of information 
explicitly indicating that the scene was set for a genocide against the Tutsi. 
Yet even after the genocide started, the United Nations’ primary response 
was to pull out its peacekeeping force.95 That response raises in relation to 
the international community the question that Power asks in relation to the 
 87. Id. ¶ 79.  
 88. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. 
 89. See SHATTERED LIVES, supra note 6, at 13. 
 90. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 6, ¶¶ 99, 107, 123, 151, 158, 173, 291. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 116, 123, 161, 291; see also POWER, supra note 1, at 350.  
 92. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 6, wherein Jean Paul Akayesu—at the time of the 
genocide, bourgmestre or mayor of the Taba commune in Rwanda—was found guilty of genocide, 
crimes against humanity (extermination, murder, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts), and direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide. 
 93. See Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101 
(2003). 
 94. See Akayesu Judgment, supra note 6, ¶¶ 100, 110, 116, 123, 149; see also POWER, supra 
note 1, at 333-34.  
 95. See POWER, supra note 1, at 352, 369.  
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United States: why was the United Nations, the international community, a 
bystander to the genocide in Rwanda? It is not lack of certitude or 
uncertainty that a genocide was occurring. The problem seemed to be in 
deciding what, if anything, was demanded of the international community 
in the face of the genocide in Rwanda. Perhaps, if there had been some 
clarity on that issue, the international community would have been quicker 
to respond. 
Months after the Rwandan genocide, in August 1994, presumably in 
the light of the genocide, the United Nations, bearing in mind the U.N. 
Study, requested that States parties to the Genocide Convention encourage 
or even undertake, by virtue of the power granted them under Article 8 of 
the Convention, 
the drafting and adoption of a control mechanism in the form of a 
treaty committee charged in particular with monitoring compliance 
of States parties with the commitments which they undertook in 
accordance with article V of the Convention, through the 
assessment of the reports submitted by the States parties and, on a 
preventive basis, to draw the attention of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to situations which may lead to genocide.96 
No such committee exists. Almost a decade later, now armed with 
Power’s book, which provides further support for the findings and 
proposals of the U.N. Study, more is demanded of the United Nations than 
a “request” to act. The international community can, once again, dust off 
the eighteen-year-old U.N. Study, update it and revise it. But nothing will 
change unless and until the international community (or the United 
Nations) turn their words into action and effectively implement the 
Study’s proposals.  
 
 
 96. Report of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities on its Forty-Sixth Session, E/CN.4/1995/2,E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994). 
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